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Summary
Reliance on experts for advice and services is instrumental in virtually all pursuits whether
it be for enterprise, political, social, or any other goal. Yet the quality of experts and their work is
something that remains frequently unchecked, which could lead to results that are surprising or
worse devastating pending the context of the case for which advice was given and what was offered
to acquire it. The potential for the quality of expert advice and service to be misleading or
overweighed was noted extensively by Justin Kruger and David Dunning in their paper “Unskilled
and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-
Assessments”. In this paper they conclude that cognitive bias facilitates practitioners to act with high
confidence despite lacking the skills or output to warrant such confidence. In this vein of
practitioners being unable to perform at the level they market themselves to have, an examination of
the investment management industry was performed to evaluate whether the returns on investment
were suitable to the costs of and supposed skills of the practitioners who partake in this market.
An examination Morgan Stanley’s recommended and approved funds to their respective
clients for both the US market, the largest and most prolific investment market by far, and the global
securities market to add international perspective were evaluated on the basis of their ability to earn
returns above investor benchmark for equity returns. Though Morgan Stanley was chosen for this
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experiment thanks to their cooperation, all other bulge bracket financial service companies provide
similar lists to their clients. The S&P 500 was chosen as the performance benchmark as it is the
index most commonly used for performance comparison by clients regardless of the fund strategy or
asset class of any fund in question.
The results showed that despite some overperformance by a minority of funds, 66% of
funds underperformed on average of -2.98% over 5 years and underperformed by nearly the same
ratio at 65% with an average performance of -1.92% on a 10 year period. These numbers become
worse when fees are taken into account which on average can cost between 1.25%-2% of annual
returns regardless of performance. This is expressed with total returns in the 5-year and 10-year
decreasing to -3.86% and -2.65%. Also worth noting is the number of funds failing to achieve a 5
year tracking performance to a 10 year tracking performance doubles suggesting that a material
number of funds fail entirely which thus should carry additional negative weight to the already poor
performance numbers.
If any haven where to be expected in global equities the results point to the opposite. Only
14% of funds where able to outperform the benchmark in a 5 year period and in 10 years that ratio
drops to 5%. Worse still, top global equities when they overperform not only fail to reach the
maximum returns achieved by US equities by as much as 1%, but when they underperform they can
perform 3% worse the greatest underperforming US equity fund. The discrepancy in performance in
regard to international managers is particularly disturbing because of how often managers of
international securities market their knowledge and expertise of non-US markets to achieve above
average returns. Furthermore, concerns of overcrowding in the US equity market based on high price
to earnings ratios has been a rallying call to get more capital into international assets. However, the
performance shows that doing so would most likely come at the detriment of the investor’s
performance. Clearly the underperformance of practitioners at this scale greatly undermines their
credibility to achieve sufficient returns on capital for their investors.
Critics and more specifically fund managers would argue that the fees they collect despite
underperforming the S&P 500 are validated by the risk they take in relation to their asset class.
Indeed if you examine the asset class benchmarks per each fund they will appear to be a much better
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product. Global equity managers often benchmark themselves against the MSCI World or MSCI
World ex US index to evaluate their performance. Unfortunately for them, investors more often than
not do not perceive performance on a relative term basis. For most absolute returns underscores their
perception of performance. So even if a fund outperforms their regional or asset class index, if it
performs below the S&P 500 than investors consider themselves at a loss due to the opportunity cost
taken from not buying the S&P 500. And considering alternative investment options in the form of
exchange traded funds (ETFs) exist, investors not only have the opportunity to access S&P 500
returns outside of traditional practitioners, but they can do at a much lower cost. As of publication 3
of the largest traded SPX index funds managed by iShares, Vanguard, and State Street currently
trade at a cost basis of 0.05%-0.09%. Thus investors can buy performance that on average
outperforms that of expert practitioners for 1/15th to 1/20th the cost. It thus should be of no surprise
that the previous mentioned ETF investment firms have received the lion’s share of new managed
assets over traditional practitioners.
Certainly, this paper wants to address the apparent overcompensation or at least the
unearned admiration that most practitioners in investment management have accumulated, but it
must be said that expert services do exist and deserve a premium. Experts that could beat the market
at their best where able to do so at 10.22% over 5 years and 6.321% over 10 years. While the decline
in performance over time plus the reduction in performance when including fees does take some of
the shine off of these high performers, their performance in and of itself is validation that investors
should be willing to listen and pay for such advice as they are getting a better deal than what they
could get elsewhere. If anything this paper is a referendum on the need to be scrupulous in the
investigation of one’s practitioners so as to not mistakenly purchase an amateur obfuscating as
professional. This is also rather simple to do in regard to investment management because unlike
other industries that can sugarcoat or disguise their performance with branding or investment in
intangible or industry unique assets to inflate balance sheet asset values, performance in investment
management is almost cruelly explicit. A return is a return and that number cannot be altered, at least
not in a manner in which legal ramifications will almost certainly arise. Thus, when the tools are
available the customer or employer of a service can verify objectively whether or not the service
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they have obtained has meet their goals. In the case of investment management, this most often boils
down to return on investment capital, but such extrapolations could also be employed in other
industries whether it in total units sold, margin improvement, or asset accumulation. However,
whether out of complacency or a lack of access, underperformers continue to thrive in the asset
management industry, and one could fairly guess that such degrees of underperformance are not
exclusive to this industry alone and are thus more prevalent.
Justin Kruger and David Dunning argued that incompetence even among the most elite of
their professions is more common due to cognitive biases that surround these practitioners. After
examining the performance of the professional class in the asset management industry, the argument
of underperforming players crowding the ranks of total practitioners becomes all the more stronger,
and thus encourages greater scrutiny of all practitioners of any industry regardless of their titles or
appearance of quality.
At the time of recording the world is currently dealing with the fallout of the COVID 19
virus thanks to a combination of incompetent containment measures facilitated by perhaps even
more incompetent or heaven forbid fraudulent consult provided by the World Health Organization.
Thus in any organization big or small, private or public the possibility that the people we assume to
be experts based on their titles or how they market themselves could be greatly misleading to the
performance they are actually able to achieve. Furthermore, the costs of failing to critically review
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1 Introduction
1.1 Dunning and Kruger Effect
Justin Kruger and David Dunning opine in their opening statements of their article
“Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to
Inflated Self-Assessments” that people often tend to have an inflated if not exaggerated view of
themselves that paints them in a far better light than what is actually true. They discovered this
behavior by both performing several studies in which the examiners scores were recorded as well as
the scores the examiners themselves believed they had scored. All together the examiners performed
at around the 12th percentile but had evaluated themselves as performing in the 62nd percentile. As
such the tendency was clear that people tend to overestimate their abilities at the expense of
revealing their actual skills. However, Kruger and Dunning note that this overestimation was largely
done unconsciously and thus those who assessed themselves as being more skilled or knowledgeable
than they actually are did so without the intent to mislead. In fact, they did so honestly believing in
their abilities without being conscious that they were subpar.
This revelation is quite damning for any professional industry as we as customers are in
reliance of the services and knowledge of others to provide the skills and services we need or
demand but do not acquire because doing so would be not only inefficient but potentially impossible.
The specialization of skills into jobs is characteristic of the modern economy which does not strive
for autarky but competitive advantages in which the focus is on selling the ability to be more
efficient, effective, or available. We do not become doctors to aid our ailing family members,
become architects when purchasing a new home, or engineers when buying a new phone. Instead we
rely on the consult of experts to provide us with the knowledge to make a decision or even make it
themselves for us to escape the burden of doing so ourselves. However, this system relies primarily
on the trust that we have in these experts to not only be competent, though for many being superb at
their position is the more desirable prerequisite, but also that the quality of their expertise is
transparent. You may hire a doctor from a reputable hospital, but if it is revealed that he has only
started his medical career or worse has a history of poor diagnoses than your confidence in the
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service provided would undoubtedly be compromised. Furthermore, if most practitioners
subconsciously inflate their abilities, how do you go about assessing the accuracy of their self-
assessment of themselves. After all if would the assessment of someone who is not an active
practitioner in an industry and thus most likely has little to now knowledge of the subject that they
are evaluating another person on be any better in providing a decent evaluation.
1.2 Investment Management
It might thus seem that picking any practitioner for help may be an impossible act for a
layman and thus is at the mercy of chance. However, there are industries in which the assessment of
performance is rather straightforward as the goals of the client are clear, and the results are difficult
to obfuscate. One such industry that is lays at the core of this piece is the asset management industry.
In the most basic terms, the industry involves clients or investors providing capital to a business with
the goal of capital appreciation and preservation for a cost. Admittedly investor goals can differ
greatly from one to individual to the next, and they almost always change with age. Yet when boiled
down investors want to either increase their assets or ensure that their value does not corrode. Many
in fact would prefer that invested capital is preserved and will also grow. This kind of having your
cake and eating it to attitude is quite common, especially considering how many investors have
grown up and realized returns greater than 10% per annum for US equities and fixed income returns
of 5%.
However, following the 2008 financial crisis the return on equities has largely stayed the
same but have dropped considerably for fixed income. Today to earn the accustomed 5% from fixed
income associated with the asset class, investors would have to buy below investment grade or junk
bonds. As the name suggests, defaults are more prevalent at this credit rating yet the owners of fixed
income assets tend to be those who are more risk adverse and thus are unable to stomach any losses
of principle. Even going up the yield curve and taking on duration by moving from a 10 year bond to
a 30 year bond still means investing in lower credit quality companies and opens up the client to
significant duration risk should there be any interest rate movement over that period which when
considering the time period means there most certainly will be. As such in order to achieve returns
that satisfy the historical investor diet, investors have to take on risk in the form of equities and or
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more volatile assets. When selecting these assets to hold, the knowledge and assessment of
professionals becomes centerfold as these are the individuals who will be responsible for producing
the returns investors hope or even expect for the price of their professional service.
This on its own underscores a simple transactional system, but what if the practitioners of
the quality that they appear to be and are unable to produce the desired returns on capital. Kruger
and Dunning shows that inflated self-assessment is natural to most people and does not need to be
conducted in a fraudulent manner for it to occur. As a result, investors could be investing with the
expectation of superb returns and instead receive subpar returns. Even more concerning is that most
managers collect annual fees on total invested assets regardless of performance on as much as 1-2%
of total assets. Indeed for more illiquid or riskier assets management fees could be in access of 10%
which means that it would have to have performance double that of the S&P 500 just to break even
from an opportunity cost perspective. These are also the types of returns that lauded investors such
as Warren Buffet and Charlie Munger achieve. So while possible, these returns are not normal and
require true experts in investment management to achieve them.
As these returns are not normal it becomes essential for the investor to know what kind of
performance they are paying for and whether or not the investment management industry is prone to
underperformance that bellies the perception of the industry discussed by Kruger and Dunning.
Furthermore, who should these managers be assessed and can it be done in a manner that is provides
better clarity to the end user than through name recognition or appraisal of other practitioners in the
field.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Greenwald Method of Competitive Competency
To assess whether or not performance is in line or not with the perceived value of
practitioners, we must establish whether or not the elite or expert practitioners in this field actually
produce results that are above average and thus deserving of the fees that they charge. The
investment management industry is no different than any other industry in that in order to achieve
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above average returns such practitioners most create and be blessed with competitive advantages that
other or most practitioners do not have access to.
In “Competition Demystified” Bruce Greenwald breaks down competitive advantage into
three tranches. Companies can produce or operate at a cost significantly below their competitors in a
manner that cannot be easily duplicated, they could have a technology or knowledge that is
exclusive to their enterprise, and or they enjoy customer loyalty from ingrained behaviors that
dissuades customers from changing and places high costs on switching. Greenwald notes that failing
to have any one of these advantages means that any companies participating do so in a competitive
market in which price is the only material differentiator which thus keeps prices low as well as
returns on capital. Amazon is good example of having competitive advantages in all three categories
and thus solid barriers to entry that keep competitors out and returns high. The company has invested
extensively in its supply chain to lower costs and ensure delivery of service greater than any of its
peers, the amazon platform though while potential could be copied would require such scale to
develop that the costs to do so would be insurmountable, and for many customers amazon is
ingrained into their consumption consciousness and might as well be as fixed as an institution like a
customer’s local city government.
Does the investment management industry have any one of these tree factors that facilitates
high returns on investment? Cost may have been an advantage in which investment was more
localized and the only entity that you could invest in was most likely your regional bank. With how
interconnected the world is today in concert with the depth of economic development in most first
world economies, there is neither a lack of companies for which you could do business with nor a
lack of interest on their part to collect your business. In fact, with online registration, you do not
even need to be in the same city, state, or even nation to do business. This makes it difficult to
establish any competitive advantages based on cost as they are usually accomplished via
monopolistic scale of the business or through regional exclusivity in which the firm is the only
player in the region. No investment management firm falls into this category and thus is not in a
position to achieve cost-based economies of scale.
10
Technology or knowledge based competitive advantages can transpire in this industry.
Though the digital age has closed the gap somewhat as more people have access to information that
would have normally only been achievable with significant financial resources, other knowledge
gaps do exist. For example the public has access to all federal documents a company legally required
to take, but their ability to visit the firms in question, speak with management, and examine key
company assets is restricted by time, resources and the industry knowledge to know what to ask. In
this scenario it would be very difficult for a layman or even a small-mid tier firm to outperform a
larger more well-endowed research team belonging to a bulge bracket. There is a reason why only a
handful of banks provide investment research to other smaller financial service companies like
Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, and Goldman Sachs provide these services and that is the because the
size required to do so is enormous and thus restricts the amount of players unless the business is
purely consultant based and thus focuses on asset research and not asset management. As of writing
Nomura Holdings has recently sold its US equity-research division and will instead import that
research from Wolf Research LLC. With this in mind, knowledge based competitive advantages can
transpire in this space and thus high returns are also a possibility.
Loyalty of customers is difficult to define as customers or investors in this space do not
behave linearly. The investment management industry often defines investors into two camps retail
and institutional. Retail investors are greater in volume but usually smaller in total assets. They are
usually hunting for the best deal they can find and are thus very price sensitive. As a result, they tend
to be quick to punish underperformance, and move frequently across vendors. Institutional investors
whether they be high net worth families or the boards of endowments tend to settle down with the
managers they enter a relationship with. This does not mean that they do not change managers, but
are usually reluctant to do so unless performance or the investment mandate they have with
managers is greatly infringed upon. This reluctance is more codified because these investors will
probably have other lending arrangements with the managers they do business with especially if the
manager in question belongs to a larger financial services company. If they switch it is often due to
succession as new generations become the family head or directors of the board may have relations
with other managers that they are more favorable to. Given that the capital maintained by these
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institutions is significant it is highly unlikely they would house it with one manager. So it is possible
that competitive advantages dictated by customer loyalty can be achieved in this industry, but it
greatly depends on the customer in question and even for the most loyal there are additional caveats
that can change their behavior.
At the end of the day the investment management industry clearly has knowledge-based
barriers to entry and has meaningful competitive advantages with regards to customer loyalty. Thus
under Greenwald’s understanding of competition, this is industry capable of earning high returns and
is not dictated purely on price. As they are capable of earning high returns, there should be reason
for outperformers to charge for their services should they achieve such returns.
2.2 Assessment of Valuation Methods
The manner in which the primary decisions an asset manager takes boils down to their
valuation of the assets in question. In this regard the most commonly in the form of the discounted
cash flow model and the capital asset pricing model better known as CAPM. While other such
valuations processes are in use such as the multiple valuation model, dividend discount model, and
other new inventions. Many can find include from the cash flow model and the CAPM model both
of which are the most common instruments of valuation are virtually taught in every Finance 101
lecture. Furthermore though experts in the investment management industry exclude their years of
investment experience as being indicative of their prowess, the instruments they use to evaluate the
investment options from which they choose from remain largely the same. Thus if we are to evaluate
whether or not practitioners in the investment management industry have the capacity to perform in
the manner that they project, we must evaluate the tools that they use as well.
2.2.1 Cash Flow
The discounted cash flow model has its origins in Irving Fisher’s “The Theory of
Investment” in which it is postulated that the value of a security is to be determined by the sum of
cash flows that the issuer will produce brought back to the present value. This present value being
determined by the expected return of the assets in question to arrive at a price befitting of the risk
taken for holding said asset. In theory this practice would be true under every circumstance had we
known both all future cash flows of the security in question and what the return that could have been
12
received was. Knowing these two variables would have given empirical evidence of the value of the
security in question. However this is not the case or at least managers do not behave in this manner.
For one managers do not know what the future cash flows nor future return will be for any
asset less they be privy to non-public information or be clairvoyant, and second work of Jerry
Hausman shows that the behavior of practitioners is that of manner that would not necessary be
considered objective. In short, Hausman’s show that among practitioners there is a high overstate
valuations, a high tolerance to pay at higher prices rather than lower prices, and that valuations differ
narrowly especially in relation to their peers. In other words practitioners are more likely to bullish
on the values of securities and pay more for them than perhaps what their cash flow models suggest,
and there are more conscious of the behavior of others rather than themselves. Thus practitioners
from the perspective of Hausman despite using traditional valuation methods that are sound in
principle are more likely to be subjective in their analysis rather than objective. In comparing the
results of practitioners to their benchmark performance perhaps than we can see whether Hausman is
overstating subjective behaviors exhibited by practitioners, or if practitioner assessment is indeed
comprised which should be reflected in a less than stellar performance of their return on investment.
2.2.2 CAPM
Though CAPM is often associated with the discount cash flow model, its incorporation of
beta as well as the use of asset weights in the variation of the weighted asset average cost of capital
model give additional credence to variables such as beta and debt loads. Introduced by Jack Treynor,
the CAPM model was a valuation tool designed not simply with the goal of finding price but also in
building a more stable portfolio. In doing so, beta or the correlation between the security and the
market was introduced so as to require a greater premium for stocks that are more correlative in
relation to the market and give discounts to those that move conversely in relation to the market. The
WACC variant does something similar with its emphasis on debt in which securities with higher
debt loads are priced cheaper than those that have larger equity weight in relation to debt because the
higher the debt load the more risk is place on debtholders as they have more to lose than equity
holders. Also the tax shield that manifest from paying interest on the debt also comes in to support
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the valuation of high debt load securities rather than low debt load securities. What Treynor
established with CAPM is true in a theoretic sense but in practice it has many flaws.
Bruce Greenwald in “Value Investing” in particular bemoans the use of CAPM based
strategies for two reasons. One a securities beta changes frequently and even those that try to wright
beta in a manner to give a more accurate result run the risk of producing a correlation number that
fails to map the security’s current and or future behavior. Second, the use of CAPM if the value is
wrong or changes frequently can result in steep changes in valuation. Greenwald shows this with a
simple perpetuity model in which a difference in the expected return from the CAPM model of just
one percent can result in a price difference of more than 10%. This problem is only exacerbated
when compounding is taken into the account of multiple periods as additional guess work on cash
flows can further pervert the valuation. It should be noted that this criticism of the CAPM model can
be directed towards the discount cash flow model as well. His recommendation is to rather than
guess what the expected return should be, establish a benchmark for what you are willing to pay for
an asset and use that as your discount 10%,15%, 20%, the number only matters in relation to how
conservative you are. Though this model also does not guarantee that the prices derived from
valuation will match that of the stock in question, it does reduce the change of overpaying and thus
underperforming if you were too generous in your valuation.
Most practitioners use the CAPM model because according to Greenwald that model is
reinforced in their education and by their peers so even if does not produce the desired results. Thus
practitioners have strong incentives to not change their behavior even though it should in practice
make them better professionals. Assuming that what Greenwald says holds true in would be in line
with the Dunning Kruger effect in which practitioner belief in their abilities obfuscates their actual
capabilities. But as with Hausman’s behavioral findings of practitioner behavior we have to test




After considering the current environment in which investment managers work, the tools
they employ, and the criticism of these practices, it is clear that there could be a misalignment of
performance amongst managers. This is in spite of examining the competitive landscape of the
investment management industry that indicates that managers should be capable of earning high
returns. But do practitioners achieve these returns and if so are they achieved by those considered to
be capable of doing so.
3.1 Sample of Evaluation
We start this assessment by accumulating a list of what would be considered high tier fund
managers. In doing so a list of the approved funds from Morgan Stanley was accumulated. The
funds on this list are the funds researched by Morgan Stanley and subsequentially made available to
advisors for recommendation to their clients for investment. All major financial service companies
compile such research as it enables advisors to select funds for investors without having to perform
extensive due diligence analysis that would be required of them had they had to perform this task
themselves. As such, the funds listed are de-facto considered by Morgan Stanley to be suitable for
investment by clients and thus should be in line with meeting their investment return goals. Or in
laymen terms, the funds listed should be considered to be managed by the best or at least are funds
appraised by other experts in investment management to be suitable for clients and thus excellent
investment choices.
The list of funds compiled focuses on two segments in the form of US equity managed
funds and global equity funds. The first list of US equity funds was chosen with greater emphasis
than the latter due to the greater investment pool of the US and its impact on all other markets. Even
with the growth of other developing economies, the US still remains the center of finance and
investment in absolute and relative terms. That being said this study wanted to give weight to
international markets through the inclusion of international investment markets especially
considering that as they are a minority in some regards and thus managers could have the potential to
offer high returns from either the exclusivity of access to these markets or from the knowledge of
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these markets that outside participants lack or are not privy to. This might even suggest that such
managers should outperform their US equity brethren assuming that their skills and knowledge are
material and thus deserving of the higher management fees associated with investing in international
markets.
3.2 Focus on US Investment Markets
Greater emphasis on the US market is further stressed not only by the size of the market and
number of funds dedicated to it, but also because the US is unlikely to depart from the position the
investment capital of the world any time soon and it is difficult to see any plausible successor to this
role even generations from now. The reason behind this is heavily weighted in currencies as they are
the means for which assets are acquired and sold. And quite frankly the role the US dollar plays in
finance and trade is so pluralistically dominant that no other currencies come even close to its
influence. Even with the recent invention of crypto currencies, so long as the two prerequisites that a
currency needs to be considered a practical currency exist, an acceptable intermediary for transaction
and a store for value, then no new challengers can be seen on the dollar’s horizon. The reason being
that crypto currencies like Bitcoin may be transferable as there are those who are willing to
exchange Bitcoin for something in return, but it fails as a store of value as seen with the dramatic
volatility in prices not to mention that any bids or asks in relation to the currency can vary widely
pending which platform you use. As such the most common users of crypto currencies have been
drug cartels and sex traffickers. Two groups whose company most reputable organizations would not
want to associate themselves with. As such hard currencies remain in vogue with the dollar at the top.
Even if we were to titillate the prospect of another hard currency replacing the dollar and
thus shifting the crown of finance to another dominion, the other currencies lack the power
projection, volume of use, and or faith as a store of value needed. Speculating over the alternative
options is quite easy as there are only eight: US Dollar, European Euro, British Pound, Japanese Yen,
Swiss Franc, Canadian Dollar, Australian/New Zealand Dollar, and the Swedish Korona. Though
considering China’s scale we will also include the Yuan but will also explain why it is not a
contender to replace the dollar.
3.2.1 Euro
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First of the Euro, originally it was created to not only serve as the main currency and thus
form of exchange within the European continent but also as a potential rival and replacement for the
US dollar in terms of international finance. Something that the Americans where not to please with
as they had invested extensively through the Marshall Plan and other projects to rebuild Europe
following the Second World War, and where also the guarantor of European security via the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO. To put it bluntly the Americans where more than offended
when the Europeans seemed to turn American charity around to strike American interests. This
hubris of the European Euro’s prospects as a rival currency to the dollar was even evident in film
with the almost eerily well timed 2008 release of James Bond: Quantum of Solace in which the main
villain when making a major transaction with Euros exclaimed “the dollar is not what it once was.”
The 2008 financial crisis certainly may have made this statement ring true for many; however any
European Federalists frothing at a bright future for the Euro were soon pacified by the European
Financial Crisis that manifested shortly after. I crisis that I might add, Europe has yet to recovery
from as evidenced by the ECB’s dovish monetary policy that has kept rates near 0. Furthermore the
Euro itself actually exacerbated this crisis as countries using the Euro no longer had sovereignty over
their monetary policy, which considering the various impacts the financial crisis had on Europe
country to country meant that the ECB could not create a monetary policy that worked for all. The
lack of good policy choices was also made worse by picking even worse decisions with the raiding
of European insurance deposits in attempt to provide capital to mediate the crisis. For those that held
Euros, it was a direct attack on the Euro’s ability to be a storage of value and they abandoned the
currency. To this day the Euro is not even the most traded currency in its own economic union. That
position has reverted back to the US dollar at the dismay of many if not all European Federalists.
Furthermore, considering the fragile political situation the European Union faces and
growth in Euro skeptic parties, the existence of the European Union and by extension the Euro is
fiercely questionable even under the best of circumstances. Even if Europe was not experiencing an
existential crisis, their poor demographics means they cannot and will never be a consumer lead
economy and our thus reliant on imports to stabilize their economy let alone hope for growth. As
such the demand for Euros is at most domestic, and even then the dollar reigns above it. Perhaps
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there was a chance that the Euro could have evolved into a potential rival with the dollar, put that
future has perished and as such investment focus will continue to remain American focused and will
not return to Europe in a substantial fashion.
3.2.2 Pound
The British Pound was once the international currency and held the position the dollar
currency holds. However, after two world wars, Britain was greatly in debt, in recession, and reliant
on US economic and military support. The fact that the economies of the US and the Soviet Union
surpassed Great Britain was also obvious to investors. However, the Soviet Union being no friend to
private property or an independent enterprise for that matter, it was fairly obvious that the crown of
international finance would move to the Americans. It seemed for a time that the UK would actually
go for greater integration within Europe and that they would ditch the pound all together for the Euro.
Instead they have chosen to go the opposite direction and are looking for their future outside of
Europe. Considering the plethora of existential crisis Europe is facing, this may in hindsight actually
be better for the UK in long term. However, one of the big lures of the British Pound was the city of
London and its location and association for the rest of Europe. Leaving the EU certainly means
losing exclusivity to extent, and while investors are not jumping head first to reposition themselves
in Frankfurt or Paris knowing full well that both governments have a liberal interpretation on what
private assets can become utilized by the government for the “public good”, the benefit of staying in
London will of course have lost some its value. Indeed, the greatest benefactor will probably be the
US as the UK likely facing an exit from the EU without a trade deal will be keener if not desperate
for one with the US. A deal in which the US will have extensive leverage and will almost certainly
result in an arrangement that is more favorable to them. As such it should be expected that the
British pound will weaken further is a reduction in usage diminishes its value as a currency. So once
again investment power lies and continues to grow with the Americans.
3.2.3 Yen
The same demographic and trade problems that plague Europe are also in play in Japan
which weakens its ability to serve as a global currency. The lack of domestic growth opportunities is
heightened by the fact that most large capital expenses made by Japanese enterprise do not transpire
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in Japan proper but in the markets they do business in. This is a strategic and tactical play that tries
to make the best of their situation. Strategic in that producing where you sell means accumulating
and spending in the local currency which reduces the risk of currency value volatility which would
be greater if production was primarily done at home and thus necessitate a higher conversion of
these currencies to yen. Tactical in that by building and producing where you sell, you improve your
supply chain and make yourself more efficient then your competitors. Lastly it is also good use of
soft power as employment of the locals builds positive prestige of Japan and Japan incorporated in
the nations that they do business in. In a way this economic model has been more successful and is
arguably being emulated by countries like Germany who interestingly enough have demographic as
bad if not worse than Japan’s. However, this also means that demand for yen largely stays local as
the international trade and investment they do uses the currencies they obtain from operations and
furthermore a lack of domestic opportunities thanks to little or no consumption growth in Japan
further stymies interest in Yen denominated assets. So Japan despite its problems has more rosier
economic future, but use of their currency will almost certainly remain primarily regional in the
most bullish of circumstances.
3.2.4 Yuan
Though perhaps not considered a hard currency by some, the Chinese Yuan’s size and the
overall size of the Chinese economy makes it difficult to ignore. The irony however is that
regardless of China’s size, China as it exists cannot make or get people on board to make the yuan a
global currency. First and foremost, doing so would mean allowing the yuan to trade freely on the
open market. However, rather than seeing greater capital inflows the reverse transpires as seen 3
year ago (2016-2017) when CCP attempted to lift controls only for roughly $1.5 trillion worth of
assets to flee the country. Consider also the massive amounts of debt China is pouring into its
economy to stimulate growth of which conservative estimates put it at 3-4 times GDP. However,
considering the degree of shadow banking, the degree of cooperation between China and its
businesses, and in general the ease of the money supply the have made available, Chinese total debt
is probably much larger. Thus they need assets to stay at home, and thus will not relinquish the tools
that allow them to maintain that control within their own country. Furthermore, one of the things that
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the Chinese Yuan lacks that arguably is what keeps it away from being considered a hard currency is
what the current 8 have which is a faith in the legal protections of the country that manages the
currency and that they will be honored. China with its mercantilist policies is not expected nor is it
expected to honor rules that may be stated on paper but would come at the expense of the state. With
the release of the new National Security Law in China as well as a flurry of other legislation initiated
by Premier Xi Jingpin, operations of any kind must come with the blessing of the CCP which does
not bode well for stability. As many investors are unwilling to the few yuan denominated assets
made available to them in the Chinese system, and unless China makes radical changes to its
economic and political system that sentiment will not change. So until then there will be many
holders of Chinese assets, but the holders of such assets will be almost entirely Chinese.
3.2.5 Others
As for the remaining hard currencies, the simple fact of the size of their economies more or
less immediately excludes them from even the possibility of offering a global currency and by
extension being the center of international finance. That does not mean nations like Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Sweden are poor or are governed in a poor fashion. Yet
the prospect of their economies providing a consumer market that can even chip away at the US let
alone the markets of the other hard currencies is a comedy not a plausibility. As such they will
mostly be traded and used to finance domestic consumption and domestic capital expenses. At the
most they may see some marginal usage amongst their neighbors, but even then a global system that
does not make.
Thus, after going through the current hard currencies it becomes clear that the US dollar
will remain the global currency and thus the center of global finance and investment. As such those
who manage assets or market themselves as professional practitioners must be able to excel at this
market because its size and strategic importance mean that any economic outcome in the US will
influence economies of the world. The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Great Depression exemplify the
ability of the US to export its economic condition upon the rest of the world. It is for these reasons
that US equities and the managers of these assets will be evaluated with precedence in respect to
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global equities as this is the market that participants must get right if they expect to fashion
themselves as professional in this field.
3.3 Benchmark
Lastly, after deciding the sample group and the field in which they shall be measured, we
decided that the best measuring stick for performance would be the use of the S&P 500 as a
benchmark. Why the S&P 500 over numerous other weighted indexes available to us? The reason is
simply that clients of investment management firms and thus investors prioritize performance of the
S&P 500 over all other indexes to contextualize performance of their investment returns. Given that
this is a study in relation to how clients feel their managers performed relative to their objectives,
and not whether managers performed reasonably relative to their asset class, using the index that
most customers associate as the litmus test for good or bad performance is thus essential.
The decision to use the S&P 500 over other indexes does not imply that it is the best index
to compare managers in relation to the assets they manage. Indeed the S&P 500 could be considered
too narrow of index to get an accurate picture of US economic and financial health as the vast
majority of business in the US is conducted in small businesses many of them family run with as
many as 2-30 employees. This is in contrast to many other nations whose development relied on
large enterprises often with assistance from the state to drive development. The economic history of
America in contrast was and is far more entrepreneurial in nature and thus indexes such as the
Russel 2000 or the Russel 3000 which encapsulate more small businesses into its index are arguably
a better reflection of US economic and financial health. However, just because that is the case does
not mean that investors see their returns from that perspective. Instead results are seeing more from
the view of opportunity costs in which performance of the S&P 500 is considered the standard and
thus performing above and below this benchmark are indications of competent and incompetent
management. Furthermore, it is the returns in relation to this index that will make them decide
between managers and thus managers are unable to champion overperformance in their sector if it
still means underperforming the S&P 500. Such performance will likely be termination of the
relationship by the client to reinvest in managers whose performance is in line or above that of the
S&P 500.
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The S&P 500 is also used to compare performance in global equities despite them being of
a different asset class to those that are held within the S&P 500. The reason behind this decision is
the same for why we did not distinguish between asset classes among US equities, clients do not
distinguish between the two. As a manager, either your fund is performing above the S&P 500 in
which case it is appraised, or it is not for which it is avoided. There are also other drawbacks to
global indexes such as the ACWI such as the difficulty in creating an appropriate index that is
weighted in an equal manner, the higher costs of investment in international markets, and client
preferences to invest in domestic and not foreign assets. Domestic asset bias, while true for all
countries, is unique in regard to US equities because even in uncertain economic periods in which
the tendency is to hold domestic assets, the US actually see significant capital inflows from foreign
countries. This is most likely attributed to the US economy’s size and security which foreign
nationals even in those residing in developed countries may see as being inferior or more generously
less apt than that of the US. As such the S&P 500 for both US and non-US securities is established
as the arbiter of investment prowess.
3.4 Variables of Concern
Now with are benchmark in hand we are able to compare performance in a meaningful way.
Specifically, we look at performance over a 5 year and 10 year cycle. Having both a 5 year and 10
year period to examine performance enables us to see how managers perform over a business cycle
as examining performance on a year by year basis can mislead us on the character of the manager’s
performance. Especially in regard to equities for which naturally material risk must be taken in order
to receive the potential rewards of offering capital. As such looking at performance over these longer
periods gives us a better perspective on the returns that managers achieve.
We also calculated performance net of fees to consider what returns the investor actually
receives. After all, investors are paying for a service and naturally managers will take their cut.
Management fees or expense ratios vary greatly from investment product, but by volume fees lay
around 1-2%, but can be as great as 10% for a minority of derivative product funds. The latter funds
are usually in the minority because they act more like insurance products and fees are a premium to
22
reduce risk, but they available and investors do invest in them on contrarian plays against or in a
fashion that is not parallel to mainstream investor opinion.
Finally, we calculate the ratio of funds that outperform the benchmark and underperform it.
If managers do provide the skills and expertise they claim to have, and indeed other branches of the
investment management business promote them to have, than at least a plurality of funds should
surpass the benchmark. Failing to do this would signal that only a minority of managers are capable
of beating the market and achieving investor goals. As such investors even when receiving the
advice of those considered to be experts on whom to invest in would be shown to have deficiencies
in the people, they suggest are capable of performing and those that actually are capable.
4 Results
The results of management performance in relation to the S&P 500 are quite sobering in
relation to the austere nature in which many of these firms are held, not to mention the salaries that
employees at these firms generally receive. Neither in the US Equities nor in Global Equities where
managers able to achieve a plurality of overperformance. In other words, outperformers are the
minority in the field of investment management, and it would seem that the industry is ripe with
professionals that Kruger and Dunning would identify as being possessed by their own sense of
brilliance and failing to see the discrepancy between their abilities and their results.
4.1 US Equity Performance
This assessment is not a radical one to make from the data as in the case of US equities only 34%
succeeded in beating the S&P 500 over a 5 year period, and in 10 year period this ratio was 35%.
Only a third of practitioners who would arguably be considered the best in class given that they were
recommended by Morgan Stanley, could achieve what investors have established as the bare
minimum of performance requirements. Even worse, in reality a third of practitioners actually did
not over perform because when fees are taken into account, the overperformance ratios for the 5 year
and 10 year drop to 22% and 13% respectively. Greater weight should be placed on the ratios with
fees included because the returns from these comparisons show performance in relation to what the
investor actually receives not the raw returns shown on the portfolio statement. Assuming this data
23
could be used as historical president, had a client invested within the pool of funds offered to them
by those deemed to professionals the investor over 5 and 10 years would have earned on average
return of –2.54% and -2.05% in relationship to their goals of achieving a return akin to the S&P 500.
Had they invested in an underperforming fund which is the more likely as they represent the
performance of all funds by 78% and 87% for the 5 year and 10 year period, then returns of –3.86%
and ---2.65% could be expected with the worst performers achieving returns of -10.04% and -
11.567% in relation to the S&P 500. Considering that the S&P 500 typically returns on average 10-
11% returns over these periods, investors thus may have even received little to nothing. In fact, they
would have been better off investing in fixed income even at the current returns of 3% and would
have done so with little risk needed. These numbers also do not take into consideration survivor bias,
and considering that some funds are not old enough to achieve a 10 year performance number this
suggests new funds were added to replace funds that failed meaning the complete loss of principle is
not weighted in these functions which would undoubtedly worsen what is already appearing to be a
very poor showing amongst the managers of US equities.
4.2 Global Equity Performance
If some positive caveat is to be taken from this it is that for those practitioners that were
able to overperform that they were able to do so with some notable outliers. Overall performance of
overperformers was at 1.95% and 1.37% over 5 and 10 year periods net of fees. With the highest
performers achieving 8.7% and 4.8% so nearly outperforming the S&P 500 by a ratio of 1.5-2. So
clearly there are practitioners who are deserving of the accolades that a thrust upon them,
unfortunately they are crowded in a sea of what is quite frankly mediocre performance in
comparison to what investors expect from their managers.
Global Equities faired not better and in fact did worse than US Equities despite practitioners
marketing their exclusivity and knowledge of international market as factors that would support
overperformance in these markets. Within the span of 5 and 10 years only 14% and 5% of managers
outperformed. When fees are included these ratios drop to 10% and 3%. Average returns over these
periods are also worse than US equities achieving –5.31% and –5.88% over 5 and 10 years, with the
worst performers achieving -13% and -12.67% which means a global equity investor on average
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likely faces no appreciation of capital and instead loss on principle. Performance amongst the
overperformers is relatively higher at 2.82% and 2.07% over 5 and 10 year periods, but considering
that the total number of firms that outperformed is half over 5 years and less than one quarter of the
number of overperforming firms in US equities the expected value for overperformers in global
equities is lower due to lower chance of investing in an overperforming fund vs an underperforming
fund. In other words, asset class does not seem to be the decisive factor in overperformance, and
investing in managers who truly have the expertise needed to succeed play a stronger weight.
4.3 Results Table
US Equities
MAX 10.224 6.321 8.724 4.821
MIN -8.54 -10.067 -10.04 -11.567
over % 2.49 1.54 1.95 1.37
under % -2.98 -1.92 -3.86 -2.65
total % -1.04 -0.55 -2.54 -2.05
SD 3.15 2.12 3.19 2.22
over 123 126 79 48
34% 35% 22% 13%
under 223 191 267 269
66% 65% 78% 87%
Drop Out 19 48 19 48
Sample 365 365 365 365
Global Equiitiies
MAX 9.596 4.98 8.096 3.48
MIN -11.53 -11.167 -13.03 -12.667
over % 3.19 2.36 2.82 2.07
under % -5.10 -4.97 -6.33 -6.28
total % -3.81 -4.38 -5.31 -5.88
SD 3.96 3.31 4.07 3.81
over 14 5 10 3
14% 5% 10% 3%
under 76 57 80 59
86% 95% 90% 97%
Drop Out 7 35 7 35
Sample 97 97 97 97
25
5 Analysis
The results on their own would suggest that managers on the whole in this enterprise either
lack the skills they need to achieve the results clients demand or perhaps even skilled practitioners
are not capable of achieving the returns demanded of them and that client goals are unrealistic.
Capacity for Performance
The latter suggestion of client goals being unrealistic with what is achievable by
practitioners can easily be thrown out because the data does show that practitioners can outperform
in this market and for some by respectable margins. Whether this was achieved from a specific
investment style, access to exclusive resources or knowledge, or some other factor cannot be
extrapolated from the data at hand and would require an in-depth analysis of each of the respective
funds. However, such research would be predicated on the notion that current succeeding investment
strategies succeed in perpetuity and that nothing changes that could displace or require changes in
investment doctrine. This sort of ossified market environment is rare in any industry and so to
assume that investment management is an outlier would be a brave if not extreme stance to take
without ample evidence. As such it is more conservative to state that expertise in this field and lead
to producing above average results. Documenting and disseminating what that expertise is and
whether it will stay true in the future is problematic even under the most optimistic of circumstances.
5.1 Client Demand Requirements
The notion that customer or clients have expectations of returns that are unreasonable and
that management is being asked something of them something that not plausible is also an
unreasonable assessment. This is because there do exist investment products with which investors
can achieve the current desired returns though the use of them does mean that they will never
perform above the goals they have set. With the emergence of exchange traded funds or ETFs,
investors are able to access equity indexes, markets and other security assets at a fraction of the cost
that they would be required to bare had they employed a traditional manager In fact, 3 of the largest
ETF providers: iShares, Vanguard, and State Street all have ETFs on the market that track the S&P
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500’s performance for an average cost expense ratio of 0.05-0.09%. Thus, investors could buy S&P
500 performance at 1/15th or 1/20th the cost of most funds in the market that try to outperform this
index. Considering that the data shows the majority of funds underperform the S&P 500 and can do
so at great margins, the option to instead buy the index rather than a manager could be seen as a
better deal especially if the investor lacks the time, research, and resources to pan through the
plethora of funds, even those recommended from reputable financial service companies, for the
small fraction of funds that can actually achieve market beating performance returns. Better yet for
clients the liquidity of these securities is so great that they can be traded daily with little concern of
the supply being too which offers much greater flexibility of use for clients. Furthermore their size
also means that they are practically offered on every investment platform so many of the traditional
costs of setting up an account, employing an advisor, and a litany of other costs that would had to be
conducted before investment can now be completely voided should the client insist. Though this is a
bare bones approach to investing and there are a plethora of services offered at major financial
institutions to better manage risk for their clients, the fact that the investor now has the choice
between the two gives them much greater leverage over practitioners than they once had. In
consideration of changes ETFs have brought to the investment management industry, It should thus
come as no surprise that these 3 ETF firms: iShares, Vanguard, and State Street have received the
majority of inflows of capital into equity security products over the last decade and if the current
trends persist it will continue on into the next decade as well.
In fact, ETFs will likely continue to play a bigger role in investment management. Already
they cost less than active manager equivalents and outperform the vast majority of them. However to
make matters worse ETF providers have signaled that they could potential lower their expense ratios
to 0%, meaning that an investor could buy S&P 500 performance at no cost to themselves outside of
the risk of holding the asset, which they would still have to take if the invested with a manager and
considering the volatility of performance of such manager the risk could be considerably worse.
How could ETF providers afford to charge nothing for their products? The answer lies in the lending
of assets on the books to other financial institutions to enable additional speculation trading and the
fees that they accumulate. Such firms that offer derivative products that only require them to have
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the asset at a certain time but otherwise would cost them to warehouse the asset on the books prefer
to pay a fee to access the asset and then return it after use. This form of asset lending has been used
in practice by all banks and large financial service companies, but ETF providers who bundle
securities into a securitized products that follow an index have been cashing in on these
opportunities as well. In fact, there is more profit to be made through asset lending so lowering
management fees to encourage customers to buy their ETFs and thus increase the total number of
deposited assets in their firms provides them a greater volume to expand their lending business and
the profits that materialize from it. This might seem that we are painting a future in which ETF
index-based funds will all but supplant active management, and many active managers have been
culled from the emergence of ETFs or have had to lower management fees or other contingent fees
baked into their products in order to stay competitive and retard the capital outflows from their funds
into ETFs. However, there will likely continue to exist a place for active management despite the
significant number of participants that fail to meet investor goals.
5.2 Changing Investment Environment
Certainly, the overperforming investment managers can confidently parade themselves to
clients because they have the return numbers that prove their competence, but what of the latter
managers. Naturally some will lose business and be culled from the market simply out of Darwinian
market mechanics for achieving the low returns that they have. But others, have reinvented
themselves on the other goal investors have in investment management besides capital appreciation
which is that they want the value of their assets preserved. Preservation of capital for some clients is
just as important if not more so for clients than maintaining performance with the S&P 500 because
doing so requires clients to take on volatility that they might not be able to stomach. Historical
performance does how that over time holding onto equities in the long term can produce the desired
double digit returns on investment desired by investors, but the value of the principle that they have
invested can also change in price by that same percentage. Normally such investors would stay in
fixed income products where they could get the desired 5% returns without having to deal with
equity like price volatility. However while 5% was the norm for fixed income products even for 10
year US treasuries, which are deemed to be the most solid investment grade asset available, the
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current financial environment no longer supports such yields. Indeed over the last decade US 10 year
treasuries have instead averaged a yield of between 2-3% and in the rest of the world such rates are
closer to 0 with equivalent yields only materializing at bond maturities of 30 years. Given these
financial conditions, it is simply the case that investment grade fixed income investments are not
enough to match investor needs without investors significantly lowering the expected return they
wish to receive for buying such securities. However if investors are unwilling to change their goals
for the return on investment, and are unwilling to change their holdings to equities, than they are
forced to either purchase bonds maturing in the far future such as 30 year or even 40 year paper
which means taking on significant duration risk as the probability that interest rates will not increase
over this period of time substantially high and thus if investors ever sell these bonds for future higher
returning bonds they will certainly have to take a loss on the principle of their investment or if not
able to stomach that be forced to keep that low rate locked in for that principle of capital invested.
Investors could also invest in credit that is below investment grade which while avoiding the risk
associated with taking on large duration, instead opens them up to equity like risk in the form of
greater chance of default in which holders of such bonds could lose 30% principle off of their initial
investment or in the worse case lose their entire principle if the defaulting issuer lacks cash even
after liquidation to pay back their debt holders. Considering that holders of fixed income securities
are usually quite sensitive to risk, the notion that they would go in either direction to make up the
current difference in yield despite doing so meaning that they would still take on equity risk is either
ludicrous or unlikely to expected of these investors. Therefore, a corridor between fixed income and
equity returns could become an attractive if not profitable sector for investors and managers who are
able to juggle the asset risk needed to be taken and ensure the principle asset value does not move
beyond the acceptable volatility boundaries that these investors can stomach.
5.3 Potential Solutions and Responses
However, the results of the data that we have seen in relation to the supposed top tier asset
managers show that the majority knowingly know that they cannot meet investor returns but market
themselves to clients that they can regardless, or are ignorant of their incapacity to achieve desired
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returns and innocently market themselves to clients only for clients to become dismayed with the
results regardless of which manager they choose.
Though rescinded in 2018, the Department of Labor originally was to push through new
policy that would require managers to be more transparent with the fees that they collected from
clients. Specifically, the commissions managers and the advisors of clients who represent and buy on
the behalf of clients receive in making the investment. The ruling was brought into play thanks in
part to apparent lack of transparency for clients to view or comprehend how the total costs where
accumulated for investment services and why they varied so great from firm to firm and advisor to
advisor. If it had not been rescinded it would have added significant stress on practitioners to be
clearer with how they conduct their practice with clients. As such the less scrupulous practitioners
would find themselves in a difficult position to explain their behavior to clients, and the
unscrupulous but perhaps overpaid practitioners would have to reevaluate their capacity as
practitioners and perhaps even alter their business model to better align themselves with customer
interests and by extension become better practitioners. The reason behind the removal of this ruling
most likely lies in the fact that it was an administrative agency ruling and not policy derived from an
act of legislation of the Congress of the United States. Thus, if members of the agency change which
they naturally due from administration to administration than policy also changes as well. Changes
to legislature are more difficult to change because once put into law they require a new piece of
legislation to change it and thus legislation in the US has a higher threshold to cross before it can be
changed than that of any of the policies produced from the various agencies of the US Federal
government.
However, if the response to this problem is to come from government, it is additional
legislation that is required to add greater transparency to the investment management industry and
not new policy from agencies that can easily be changed from administration to administration. After
all investment is not simply in relation to the depositing of capital goods to increase development
and facilitate private and or public enterprise. While such actions are important and essential to the
preservation and future growth of any economy, investment of capital is also utilized to support the
elderly demographics which rely on retirement savings from personal, corporate, and public sources.
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Regardless of whether such retirement spending is financed privately and or publicly, they bare an
impact on the society writ large especially as the demographics of all economies not just developed
nations become more concentrated in the 65+ age rage in which for many retirement is expected or
at the least capital for retirement expenditures becomes available under most government sponsored
plans. Furthermore the promises made by public governments to their pensioner communities either
through policy or legislation is unlikely to change as the elderly demographics make up the lions
share of most populations of countries who have made such promises. Their leverage in government
is also magnified by their materially higher participation rate in elections compared to younger
demographics which gives them an a much stronger say in the policy direction taken by their
respective elected governments. Even if younger generations voted at the same rate as their elderly
counterparts, the notion that they would defund these pension promises is also unlikely because in
doing so the personal savings of these retirees is unlikely to compensate the expenditures that the
elderly will have in order to live independently. As a result many would be forced by financial and
economic circumstances along to move in with their children and or grandchildren for support. A
scenario wildly unpopular among these younger demographics especially considering that many of
them as well have savings that are low and thus make them prone to economic hardship should they
face recessionary circumstances in their country’s economy. So at the end of the day, if these
retirement plans are not well financed they become burdens on the state to either fill in the deficit or
failing that become burdens onto the families of pensioners whom if lacking in savings could
witness significant drops in consumerism as families are forced to consolidate less they leave their
grandparents to whither on the side of the road in poverty. All of which would facilitate an economic
contraction from the reduced consumer spending which thus opens all facets of life to economic
hardship.
5.4 Going Concerns
Thus the selection of competent managers to invest for retirement purposes carries a social
good as strong as the importance for capital selection for the purposes of economic develop and
principal appreciation. So far, the data suggests that the majority of managers are not able to match
investor return goals, and if investors are reliant on achieving those returns to cover future expenses
31
they are likely in for a rude surprise when they realize that the accumulated returns they thought they
were getting from the supposed expert practitioners is revealed to be less than what was sold to them.
Unfortunately, the negative externalities of this outcome are unlikely to be restricted to the users of
such services and the tab will most likely be picked up by the society at large despite most of them
having no direct influence in enabling these negative events from transpiring in the first place and
will almost certainly feel quite bitter to say the least of the new and undesirable circumstances that
have been thrust upon them. Indeed, the notion that this potential scenario gets resolved in a civil
manner and does not cause outrage and protest from significant sectors of the populace is difficult to
fathom. Nor will the politicians or individuals responsible for coming up with a solution be well
equipped to provide such a solution that good be amicable to all parties involved.
6 Conclusion
The results of Kruger and Dunning research in human psychology in relation to how people
evaluate themselves and how this can give the appearance of heightened levels of expertise without
deserving such accreditation, inspired evaluations in whether professional practitioners indeed are
imbued with the skills and knowledge that requires them to adequately be experts in their field. The
lens of this examination was directed in particular to the investment management industry as it was
one in which clear distinctions between practitioners performance and the expected performance of
clients could be compared with few variables to pervert or liberalize the interpretation of the results.
After cross comparison of the performance of fund managers selected by other professional
analysts in the industry, and thus deeming the selected funds as being managed by the apparent
expert professionals, with that of client expectations of performance, it was discovered that most
managers underperform in relation to expectations. Depending on asset class only 10-20% of
managers managed to overperform with many adding only a slight premium above the S&P 500
which clients could be forgiven for thinking is an insufficient premium for the risk they take for
investing in equities. The data does show that a minority of fund managers where able to outperform
their benchmarks, with some achieving material premiums above the S&P 500, and thus indicating
that there are practitioners in this space capable of outperforming and thus deserving of the fees they
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charge for their services. Unfortunately, the vast majority of fund managers, even those proposed by
declared experts in the industry, are more likely to underperform and miss the investment objectives
of their clients. This is not meant to be considered a condemnation of the investment management
business nor accuses it of acting in a fraudulent or misleading manner, though it is also true that such
behavior is possible. Emphasis is however stress from the results of this case practitioners in an
industry that we assume to be experts because of their positions in the industry and their
recommendation by other branches of the industry paints a picture of their abilities that simply does
not match with the results they are able to achieve.
Nor should it be assumed that such phenomena be considered unique to the investment
management industry, as we are reliant on the supposed expertise of professionals in all industries
and services we use that we ourselves are not experts in. The conundrum that the people we rely on
for service may not be fit to the job asked of them despite them and other parties signaling that they
can is deeply disturbing and naturally has far reaching negative consequences in performance,
planning, and other social concerns.
Such negative externalities where further noted in relation to the investment management
industry with respective to their role in managing retirement savings and the investments of other
key societal entities reliant on these returns such as health care and government infrastructure.
Failing to meet the investment goals of these entities will naturally cause deficits in financing
requirements that will naturally role over from the direct parties involved and effect all other parties
in society for whom policy will have to be taken to mediate the negative externalities from these
financing deficits because taking no policy would still produce negative societal impacts through
economic contraction.
How this problem within the investment management industry can be resolved and the issue
of transparency of skills dictated by Kruger and Dunning that is most likely prevalent in other
industries, is difficult to resolve. Policy attempts to increase transparency have been attempted in the
US by Federal agencies but have at the time of writing been withdrawn. Proposals for legislative
changes to address such problems provide a path forward to improvement, but this case does not
have the data required to craft the sort of crisp and clear policy that the situation demands. It would
33
thus be best if further study of policy or legislative initiatives targeting greater transparency of
practitioner capacity to clients would be initiated to analyze the effects of such actions should they
be implemented into law. This however assumes that solution comes only from public enforcement
whereas a private solution could be implemented as well. However, either due to a lack of current
actor engaging in such actions or a lack of imagination and or innovation it is difficult though not
impossible to see a private solution being the answer.
Even with a lack of answers the importance of the issue at hand remains as the market
practices that we take in stride are reliant on our trust of the other party in a transaction to be honest
and transparent with the product or service offered in transaction. Even if the other party is honest
but oblivious to the inferiority of the product or service they are offering the net benefit is the same
to the customer who will naturally become displeased when they discover that the exchange they
have made has not resulted in the benefit or gain they thought they would receive. Should this
continue, the faith we have in transactions for goods and services will naturally be complicated and
or more constricted from a lack of faith of the quality of the received good or service transacted.
This would have far reaching negative repercussions on the consumption based economic models
that are in use today and for which we rely upon for future economic growth.
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Appendix
US Equities
MAX 10.224 6.321 8.724 4.821
MIN -8.54 -10.067 -10.04 -11.567
over % 2.49 1.54 1.95 1.37
under % -2.98 -1.92 -3.86 -2.65
total % -1.04 -0.55 -2.54 -2.05
SD 3.15 2.12 3.19 2.22
over 123 126 79 48
34% 35% 22% 13%
under 223 191 267 269
66% 65% 78% 87%
Drop Out 19 48 19 48
Sample 365 365 365 365
Global Equiitiies
MAX 9.596 4.98 8.096 3.48
MIN -11.53 -11.167 -13.03 -12.667
over % 3.19 2.36 2.82 2.07
under % -5.10 -4.97 -6.33 -6.28
total % -3.81 -4.38 -5.31 -5.88
SD 3.96 3.31 4.07 3.81
over 14 5 10 3
14% 5% 10% 3%
under 76 57 80 59
86% 95% 90% 97%
Drop Out 7 35 7 35
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*Note that list of total funds examined, names, performance, and other metrics is included in the







0 20 40 60 80 100 120












0 20 40 60 80 100 120
10 Year w/ Fees Global
